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Abstract
We revisit Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast with honest dealer algorithms in multi-hop networks. To tolerate
Byzantine faulty nodes arbitrarily spread over the network, previous solutions require a factorial number of messages
to be sent over the network if the messages are not authenticated (e.g., digital signatures are not available). We
propose modifications that preserve the safety and liveness properties of the original unauthenticated protocols,
while highly decreasing their observed message complexity when simulated on several classes of graph topologies,
potentially opening to their employment.
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Main text
Designing dependable and secure distributed systems and
networks that are able to cope with various types of adver-
saries (ranging from simple errors to internal or external
attackers) requires to integrate those risks from the very
early design stages. The most general attack model in a
distributed setting is the Byzantine model, where a subset
of system participants may behave arbitrarily (including
malicious), while the rest of participants remains cor-
rect. Also, reliable communication primitives are a core
building block of any distributed system.
We consider the reliable broadcast with honest dealer
problem in the presence of Byzantine failures, i.e., the
problem of distributing information from a source to every
other process considering that a subset of nodes may act
arbitrarily. The reliable broadcast primitive is expected to
provide two guarantees: (i) safety, i.e., every message m
delivered by a correct node has been previously sent by
the source, and (ii) liveness, i.e., every message m sent by
a correct source is eventually delivered by every correct
node.
We are interested in solving this problem in a multi-
hop network, in which nodes are not directly connected to
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every other (i.e., the network is not complete). In particu-
lar, nodes may have to rely on intermediate ones (hops) in
order to communicate, forwarding messages till the final
destination. In case the entire system is correct, the solu-
tion to reliable broadcast is trivial; every node has just to
forward the received messages to all of its other neighbors
(or it has to question a routing table to know which is the
next node to route a specific message), and if the network
is connected, then it is possible for every node to com-
municate with every other. Contrarily, if just one single
node is faulty, specifically Byzantine faulty, two problems
may arise: (i) messages can be modified or generated by
faulty nodes that pretend the messages were sent from
another node, and (ii) messages can be blocked preventing
nodes to communicate. It follows that a more sophisti-
cated protocol has to be put in place to ensure the correct
communication between the parties.
Lastly, we are interested in unauthenticated solutions,
namely in protocols where messages cannot be directly
authenticated (e.g., employing digital signatures), and
thus, the nodes cannot immediately verify that a specific
received message has been previously sent by a specific
other node.
The reliable broadcast with honest dealer enables
to simulate a completely connected distributed system
equipped with reliable and authenticated channels. It fol-
lows that all the solutions designed for completely con-
nected distributed system (Byzantine agreement, Byzan-
tine reliable broadcast, etc.) can be directly deployed on
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top of a multi-hop network once the reliable broadcast
service has been deployed.
Related works
The necessary and sufficient condition to solve the reli-
able broadcast with honest dealer problem on general
networks has been identified by Dolev [7], demonstrating
that it can be solved if and only if the network is 2f + 1-
connected, where f is the maximum number of Byzantine
faulty nodes.
Subsequently, research efforts followed three paths:
(i) replacing global conditions with local conditions, (ii)
employing cryptographic primitives, or (iii) considering
weaker broadcast specifications.
The Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA) [24] is a
protocol that solves reliable broadcast in networks where
the number of Byzantine nodes is locally bounded, i.e.,
in any given neighborhood, at most f processes can be
Byzantine. This algorithm has been later extended [23]
along several directions: (i) considering different thresh-
olds for each neighborhood, (ii) considering additional
knowledge about the network topology, and (iii) consider-
ing the general adversary model.
The Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast with hon-
est dealer can also be addressed employing cryptogra-
phy (e.g., digital signatures) [5, 9] that enables all nodes
to exchange messages guaranteeing authentication and
integrity (authenticated protocols). The main advantage
is that the problem can be solved with simpler solutions
and weaker conditions (in terms of connectivity require-
ments). However, on the negative side, most of those
solutions rely on a third party that handles and guarantees
the cryptographic keys; thus, the safety of those protocols
is bounded to the cryptosystem (a potential single point of
failure).
Lastly, the broadcast problem has been considered
weakening safety and/or liveness property, e.g., allowing
to a (small) part of correct processes either to deliver fake
messages or to never deliver a valid message [17–19].
Let us note that a common assumption considered
by Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast protocols is to
use authenticated point-to-point channels, which pre-
vents a process from impersonating several others (Sybil
attack) [8]. The real difference between cryptographic
(authenticated) and non-cryptographic (unauthenticated)
protocols for reliable broadcast is how the cryptogra-
phy is employed: non-cryptographic protocols, in fact,
may use digital signatures just within neighbors for
authentication purposes, whereas the cryptographic pro-
tocols make use of cryptographic primitives to enable
the message verification even between non-directly con-
nected nodes. Let us finally remark that an authen-
ticated channel not necessarily requires the use of
cryptography [27].
Although the Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast
problem with honest dealer has been extensively stud-
ied considering alternative and additional assumptions,
the solution provided by Dolev [7] is the only one for
general settings and it has never been revisited from a per-
formance perspective. Indeed, this solution hints at poor
scalability since it requires a factorial number of copies
(with respect the size of the network) of the same mes-
sage to be spread and potentially verified in order to be
accepted. This suggest that solving reliable broadcast in
the weakest system model (i.e., Dolev’s solution [7]) is
practically infeasible.
Contributions
We review and improve previous solutions for reliable
broadcast in multi-hop networks, where at most f nodes
can be Byzantine faulty, making no further assumption
with respect to the original setting [7]. In more details,
(i) we propose and evaluate modifications to the state-of-
the-art protocols that preserve both safety and liveness
properties of the original algorithms, and (ii) we define
message selection policies in order to prevent Byzantine
faulty nodes from flooding the network and to reduce the
total number of messages exchanged.
In a preliminary work [3], we focused on random net-
work topologies, we defined two modifications to the
state-of-the-art protocols, we proposed one preliminary
message selection technique, and we carried out a per-
formance analysis in the scenario where all processes are
correct. In this work, by extensive simulations for vari-
ously shaped networks and considering active Byzantine
processes spreading spurious messages over the network,
we show that our modifications enable to keep the mes-
sage complexity close to quadratic (in the size of the
network). Our work thus paves the way for the practical
use of Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast solutions in
realistic-size networks.
Systemmodel and problem statement
Systemmodel
We consider a distributed system composed by a set of n
processes  = {p1, p2, . . . pn}, each one having a unique
integer identifier. Processes are arranged in a communica-
tion network. This network can be seen as an undirected
graph G = (V ,E) where each node represents a process
pi ∈  (i.e. V = ) and each edge represents a commu-
nication channel connecting two of them pi, pj ∈  (i.e.
E ⊂   ), such that pi and pj can communicate. In the
following, we interchangeably use terms process and node
and we refer to edges, links, and communication channels
similarly.
We assume an omniscient adversary able to control up
to f processes allowing them to behave arbitrarily. We call
them Byzantine processes. All the processes that are not
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Byzantine faulty are correct. Correct processes do not a
priori know the subset of Byzantine processes. Processes
have no global knowledge about the system (i.e., the size or
the topology of the network) except the value of f.
Communication channels allow connected pro-
cesses to exchange messages, providing two interfaces:
SEND(pdest,m) and RECEIVE(psource,m). The former
requests to send a message m to process pdest, and the
latter delivers the message m sent by process psource. Pro-
cesses that are not linked with a communication channel
have to rely on others that relay their messages in order to
communicate in a multi-hop fashion. We assume reliable
and authenticated communication channels, which pro-
vide the following guarantees: (i) reliable delivery, namely
if a correct process sends a message m to a correct pro-
cess q, then q eventually receives m; (ii) authentication,
namely if a correct process q receives a message m with
sender p, thenm was previously sent to q by p.
We consider a synchronous system, namely we assume
that (i) there is a known upper bound on the message
transmission delays and (ii) a known upper bound on the
processing delays. We assume a computation that evolves
in sequential synchronous rounds. Every round is divided
in three phases: (1) send, where processes send all the
messages for the current round; (2) receive, where pro-
cesses receive all the messages sent at the beginning of the
current round; and (3) computation, where processes exe-
cute the computation required by the specific protocol.
In a single round, any message can traverse exactly one
hop, namely the message exchange occurs only between
neighbor processes. We measure the time in terms of the
number of rounds.
Problem statement
We consider the reliable broadcast with honest dealer
problem from a source s assuming f Byzantine failures
arbitrary spread in the network [7]. A protocol solves the
Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast (BRB) with honest
dealer problem if the following conditions are met:
– Safety. If a correct process delivers a message m, then
it has been previously sent by the source.
– Liveness. If a correct source broadcast a message m,
then m is eventually delivered by every correct
process.
Notice that in the case of a correct source, all correct pro-
cesses deliver the broadcast message. Instead, if the source
is Byzantine faulty, then not all correct processes necessar-
ily deliver the broadcast message and/or they may deliver
different messages.
We referred (following the literature) with message m
to a content (i.e., a value) that has been broadcast. Every
information spreading protocol places a content inside a
message with a specific format, adding protocol related
overhead. Therefore, to ease of explanation, we refer with
content to the value that has been broadcast and with
message to the one exchanged by a protocol. Therefore, a
message refers to the union of a content and the overhead
added by the employed protocols.
Background
We start by presenting and remarking some definitions
and theoretical results to lead the reader in an easier
understanding. Subsequently, we present the state-of-the-
art protocols in solving the BRB problem and we provide
an analysis of them.
Basic definitions and fundamental results
For all the definitions and results that follow, let us con-
sider the cube graph Gˆ depicted in Fig. 1 as example.
Definition 1 (neighbors) Given an undirected graph
G = (V ,E), two nodes u, v are adjacent or neighbors if
there is an edge connecting them (i.e., {u, v} ∈ E).
In graph Gˆ, the neighbors of node u are nodes a, b, and
c.
Definition 2 (path) Given an undirected graph G =
(V ,E), a path is a sequence of adjacent nodes without rep-
etitions (i.e., path := (v1, v2, . . . , vx) : ∀i ∈ [ 1, x − 1], vi ∈
V , {vi, vi+1} ∈ E). The two extreme nodes of a path are
called ends.
Definition 3 (connected nodes and connected graph)
Given an undirected graph G = (V ,E), two nodes u, v are
connected if there exist at least one path with ends u, v, they
are disconnected otherwise. The graph G is connected if it
exist at least one path between every pair of nodes.
In graph Gˆ, the sequence (u, a, e, v) is a path with ends u
and v; thus, nodes u and v are connected.
Definition 4 (independent/disjoint paths) Given an
undirected graph G = (V ,E), two or more of its paths are
independent or disjoint if they share no node except their
ends.
In graph Gˆ, the sequence (u, c, f , v) is another path that
is disjoint with respect to (u, a, e, v).
Definition 5 (vertex cut) Given an undirected graph
G = (V ,E), the removal of a set of nodes C ⊂ V from G
results in a subgraph GC = (VC ,EC), where VC = V − C
and EC ⊂ E : ∀{vi, vj} ∈ E, {vi, vj} ∈ EC ⇐⇒ vi, vj /∈ C.
Given two not adjacent nodes u, v ∈ V, a vertex cut C ⊂
V − {u, v} for u, v is a set of nodes whose removal from the
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Fig. 1 Disjoint paths (a) and vertex cut (b) of a cube graph
graph G disconnects u from v, namely u, v are disconnected
in GC.
In graph Gˆ, the set of nodes {d, e, f } is a vertex cut for
(u, v), because its removal will disconnect nodes u from v.
Given an undirected graphG = (V ,E) and two not adja-
cent nodes u, v, themaximumnumber of mutually disjoint
paths with ends u and v is referred with κ ′(u, v), and the
size of the smallest vertex cut C separating u from v is
referred with κ(u, v).
Remark 1 (Global Menger Theorem) A graph is k-
connected (or it has vertex connectivity equals to k) if and
only if it contains k-independent paths between any two
vertices.
Remark 2 (vertex cut vs disjoint paths) Let G = (V ,E)
be a graph and u, v ∈ V. Then, the minimum number
of vertexes that disconnects u from v in G is equal to the
maximum number of disjoint u − v paths in G, namely
κ(u, v) = κ ′(u, v).
In graph Gˆ, the maximum number of disjoint paths
between nodes u, v (κ ′(u, v)) is 3, as depicted in Fig. 1a.
Furthermore, at least 3 nodes have to be removed from the
network in order to disconnect nodes u, v (Fig. 1b), thus
showing the equivalence κ ′(u, v) = κ(u, v).
The reader can refer to [6] for additional details.
The Byzantine reliable broadcast problem can be solved
under the assumptions we considered in the systemmodel
when the following condition is met:
Remark 3 (condition for Byzantine reliable broadcast
[7]) Given a network G composed of n processes where
at most f can be Byzantine faulty, the Byzantine reli-
able broadcast can be achieved if and only if the vertex
connectivity of G is at least 2f + 1.
Byzantine reliable broadcast protocols
There exists two solutions addressing the Byzantine reli-
able broadcast with honest dealer problem in the system
model we considered, which are the Dolev [7] and the
Maurer et al. [20] algorithms. Any other solutions for
the BRB problem make extra or different assumptions
(e.g., digital signatures, higher density networks, weaker
versions of safety or liveness).
The protocols that follow are defined by:
– A propagation algorithm, which rules how messages
are spread over the network
– A verification algorithm, that decides if a content can
be accepted by a process guaranteeing the safety of
reliable broadcast
The basic idea behind the following protocols is to lever-
age the authenticated channels to collect the labels of
processes traversed by a content, in order to compute the
maximum disjoint paths, in the case of Dolev, or the min-
imum vertex cut, in the case of Maurer et al., of all the
paths traversed by the content. Those two methodologies
are theoretically equivalent due to the Menger Theorem
(Remark 2), i.e., if a message can traverse f + 1 disjoint
paths in a network, then it can traverse paths such that
their minimum vertex cut is f + 1 and vice versa.
Dolev reliable broadcast protocol (D-BRB)
Dolev [7] defined the seminal algorithm addressing the
BRB problem. The messages exchanged by his proto-
col have the format m := 〈s, content, path〉, where s is
the label of the process asserting to be the source, con-
tent is the content to broadcast, and path is a sequence
of nodes.
Propagation algorithm:
1. The source process s sends the message
m = 〈s, content,∅〉 to all of its neighbors;
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2. A correct process p saves and relays any message
m = 〈s, content, pathi〉 sent by a neighbor q to all of
other neighbors not included in pathi, appending to
pathi the label of the sender q, namely process p
stores and multicastsm = 〈s, content, pathi ∪ {q}〉.
The messages carrying pathi with loops or pathi that
includes the label of the receiving process p are
discarded at reception.
Verification algorithm:
1. Given a set of messagesmi = 〈s, content, pathi〉
received by process p and carrying the same values
for s and content, the content is delivered by p if
there exist f + 1 disjoint paths among of all the
related pathi.
Maurer et al. reliable broadcast protocol (MTD-BRB)
Maurer et al. [20] extended and improved the algorithm
defined by Dolev to deal with dynamic distributed sys-
tems, where the communication network changes over the
time. As a matter of fact, a static communication network
(our case) can be seen as a dynamic network that never
changes, making their solution employable on the system
model we are considering.
The format of messages exchanged by their protocol is
m := 〈s, content, pathset〉, again carrying the information
about the process s asserting to be the source and the
content of broadcast. The difference with respect the pre-
vious algorithm is the data structure employed to collect
the labels of traversed nodes: pathset, that it discards the
traversing order.
Furthermore, MTD-BRB verifies the minimum vertex
cut of the pathset traversed by a content instead of the
maximum disjoint paths. The reason is that on dynamic
networks the Menger theorem (Remark 3) does not hold,
specifically the minimum vertex cut may be greater than
or equal to the maximum disjoint paths between two
nodes [15].
Propagation algorithm:
1. The source process s sends them = 〈s, content,∅〉 to
all of its neighbors;
2. A correct process p saves and relays any message
m = 〈s, content, pathseti〉 sent by a neighbor q to all
of other neighbors not included in pathseti,
appending to pathseti the label of the sender q,
namely process p stores and multicasts
m = 〈s, content, pathseti ∪ {q}〉.
The messages carrying pathseti with duplicates or
pathseti that includes the label of the receiving
process p are discarded at reception.
Verification algorithm:
1. Given a set of messagesmi = 〈s, content, pathseti〉
received by process p and carrying the same values of
s and content, the content is delivered by p if the
minimum vertex cut of the related pathseti is at least
f + 1.
Discussion
The two protocols we presented are quiescent, namely at a
certain point, all correct processes stop sending messages.
To be precise, this is true only if all processes are correct
or at least the additional knowledge about the size of the
system is given to the processes to guarantee the termina-
tion of message spreading. Contrarily, a Byzantine process
may continuously introduce spurious messages carrying
˜pathi/pathseti = {random_label} that are forwarded to all
processes. We temporarily assume, for ease of evaluation,
that all processes are correct in the analysis that follows.
In order to evaluate and compare the protocols reported
and the solution we are going to design, we analyze the
following metrics:
1. Message complexity, i.e., the total number of
messages exchanged in a single broadcast (the
amount of messages exchanged from the beginning
of the broadcast till the moment when all processes
stop sending messages);
2. Delivery computational complexity, i.e., the
complexity of the procedure executed by a process
during the computation phase to decide if a content
can be accepted;
3. Broadcast latency, i.e., the time between the
beginning of the broadcast and the time when all
correct processes deliver the content.
The message complexity of D-BRB protocol is factorial in
the size of the network. The reason is that for every path
connecting the source with any other node (i.e., that are
order of the permutations over the full set of nodes) a
message with related pathi is generated. This potentially
results in an factorial number of pathi to elaborate by
every process in order to deliver a single content. For sake
of explanation, let us consider the cube graph depicted
in Fig. 1 and let us assume that process u starts a broa-
cast, thus spreading a content with an empty path that will
traverse the paths (u, a), (u, b), and (u, c) on the commu-
nication network. The neighbors of the source will receive
the content and its related (empty) path, they will attach
the label of the sender, and they will forward it to all of
their neighbors not already included, e.g., process a will
forward the content with the path (u) to processes d and
e, and thus, a message related to the paths (u, a, d) and
(u, a, e) will be generated (and the same will be done also
by processes b and c). The process d will receive the path
(u) from a and b (the same happens for processes e and f
from different processes). Consequently, a message carry-
ing (u, a) will be forwarded by d to b and v and a message
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carrying (u, b) will be sent by d to a and v. The messages
continue to be generated as long as all possible paths are
traversed, one message for each path.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the only
method available to identify f + 1 disjoint pathi is the
reduction to a NP-complete problem, Set Packing [11].We
refer to this method with DP (disjoint paths), namely to
the reduction and solution of the associated Set Packing
instance. This implies that the delivery complexity of the
algorithm is exponential.
The D-BRB guarantees the safety and liveness prop-
erties of BRB when the strict enabling condition is
met (Remark 3), respectively because the Byzantine pro-
cesses b1, b2, . . . bf cannot propagate a different content˜content = content with source s through no more than f
disjoint paths, and assuming a vertex cut of size f made by
the faulty processes, f + 1 disjoint paths are still available
between any pairs of correct processes.
The MTD-BRB protocol is equivalent with respect the
message complexity and delivery complexity to D-BRB.
Specifically, even if all the pathsi over the same set of
nodes are all collapsed in a single pathset, they are still
factorial in the number of nodes (i.e., they are order of
the combinations over the full set of nodes), and messages
carrying any possible pathseti are generated, potentially
leading to an input of factorial size for the verification
algorithm.
Again, to the best of our knowledge, the only method
available to identify a vertex cut of size less than or equal
to f is the reduction to aNP-complete problem,Hitting Set
[11]. We refer to this method as VC (vertex cut), namely
to the reduction and solution of the associated Hitting Set
instance. This implies that the delivery complexity of this
algorithm is exponential too.
The safety and liveness properties of BRB are guaran-
teed by MTD-BRB due to the same argumentation made
for D-BRB: the Byzantine processes b1, b2, . . . bf cannot
propagate a different content ˜content = content with
source s through pathsets with a minimum vertex cut
greater than f and they cannot make a vertex cut on the
communication network greater than f.
The broadcast latency of both protocols is bounded by
the graph metric called wide diameter [12]. Given a k-
connected graph G, the wide diameter is the maximum
number l such that there exist k internally disjoint (u, v)-
paths in G of length at most l between any pair of vertices
u and v. This value depends on the graph topology. In the
worst case, the wide diameter of a graph is n−k [13]. It fol-
lows that the broadcast latency of both protocols is upper
bounded by n − k, because in at most n − k rounds k dis-
joint paths are traversed between every pair of nodes. As
a clarifying example, let us consider a k-connected gen-
eralized wheel graph with n nodes that is composed by
the disjoint union between a cycle and a k − 2 clique (a
graphical example is depicted in Fig. 5b), let us chose as
source a node on the cycle, and let us focus on one of its
neighbors on the cycle at distance two. It is possible to ver-
ify that in order to interconnect the pair of nodes we are
considering through k disjoint paths, one path of length
n − k has to be traversed.
Table 1 summarizes the presented analysis.
Practical reliable broadcast protocol
Due to the high message complexity and delivery compu-
tational complexity of the reviewed protocols, they do not
scale and they cannot be successfully employed.
We further analyze some deeper details of the afore-
mentioned protocols, and we define simple modifications
that result in drastically reducing the message complex-
ity. Specifically, we start by arguing that pathsets and VC
should be preferred respectively as message format and
verification algorithm. Subsequently, we propose modi-
fications that aim in reducing the amount of messages
spread by preventing from forwarding useless messages,
thus redefining a protocol solving BRB.
Paths vs pathsets
It is possible to note that given the solutions available,
there is no reason to prefer path over pathset while collect-
ing the label of the traversed processes; indeed, (i) due to
the reduction to set related problems, paths are converted
into sets to be analyzed, (ii) two paths over the same set
of nodes are not disjoint and have a cut of size equal to
1, and (iii) the pathsets interconnecting two endpoints are
fewer than the relative paths. For those reasons, we adopt
the pathset data structure as message format to collect
the labels of traversed processes in designing an improved
protocol.
Minimum vertex cut vs maximum disjoint paths
We remark that both verification algorithms solve a NP-
complete problem, and considering the Menger theorem
in Remark 2, one may conclude that there is no tangible
reason to prefer one among VC and DP. As a matter of
fact, the equivalence between the twometrics in Remark 2
occurs when no restriction on the length of the paths
is assumed. In fact, when the path length is bounded,
the minimum vertex cut between two nodes may be
higher than or equal to the maximum number of disjoint
paths interconnecting them [16]. Let us take the example
Table 1 Analysis of the state-of-the-art protocols
Dolev Maurer et al.
Message complexity Factorial (permutations
of nodes)
Factorial (combinations
of nodes)
Delivery complexity NP NP
Broadcast latency ≤ n − k ≤ n − k
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Fig. 2 Graph example to compare minimum vertex cut and
maximum disjoint paths
proposed in Fig. 2 [16], and let us focus on nodes u and
v as endpoints and consider only the paths of length at
most 5. It can be verified that at least two nodes have to be
removed from the graph in order to disconnect u from v
considering only the paths of length at most 5. Neverthe-
less, no two disjoint paths exist considering only the paths
with the same constraint. In other words, given a graph
G of n nodes and considering only the paths of length at
most l < n, the size of the minimum vertex cut of those
interconnecting two nodes may be greater than or equal
to themaximum number of disjoint paths interconnecting
them. This implies that whenever a synchronous system
is assumed and the paths are all traversed synchronously
like in our system model (i.e., the paths of length 1 are all
traversed in 1 instant (round), the paths of length 2 are all
traversed in two instants (round)), it may be possible to
interconnect two endpoints with a minimum cut equal to
k in fewer hops (i.e., rounds) with respect k disjoint paths.
This results also in saving in message complexity if a halt-
ing condition is embedded inside the protocol, namely if
the message propagation stops when all correct processes
delivered the content. For this reason, we adopt VC as
verification methodology.
Improvements
Practical reliable broadcast protocol (BFT-BRB)
We redefine a protocol for the Byzantine reliable broad-
cast with honest dealer. This protocol employs the same
message format and verification algorithm of MTD-BRB,
namely the label of the processes traversed by a mes-
sage is collected in pathsets and the contents are ver-
ified through the VC methodology. We introduce four
modifications in the propagation algorithm and one in
the verification algorithm that aim to reduce the total
number of messages exchanged, and we prove their cor-
rectness, namely that their employment does not pre-
vent the original algorithms of Dolev and Maurer et al.
from enforcing safety and liveness of Byzantine reliable
broadcast with honest dealer when the strict enabling
condition is met (Remark 3), because they prevent from
forwarding messages that are not useful for the delivery of
a content.
Modification 1 If a process p receives a content directly
from the source s (i.e., the source and the sender coincides),
then it is directly delivered by p.
Modification 2 If a process p has delivered a content,
then it can discard all the related pathsets and relay the
content only with an empty pathset to all of its neighbors.
Modification 3 A process p relays pathsets related to a
content only to the neighbors that have not yet delivered it.
Modification 4 If a process p receives a content with an
empty pathset from a neighbor q, then p can discard from
relaying and analyzing any further pathset related to the
content that contains the label of q.
Modification 5 A process p stops relaying further path-
sets related to a content after it has been delivered and the
empty pathset has been forwarded.
Modification 1 follows from the definitions of disjoint
paths and vertex cut; indeed, a path of length 2 is disjoint
with respect every other one with the same ends, and the
vertex cut is defined between not adjacent nodes; thus,
there is no vertex cut between neighbors.
The purpose of Modifications 2, 3, and 4 is to reduce
the amount of messages exchanged by the protocol and
to be analyzed by processes. Modification 2 also provides
a transparent way to get the neighbors q of a process p
know that a specific content has been delivered by p. This
one has already been employed [22] for the purpose of
topology reconstruction.
Modification 5 introduces a halting condition in the
protocol with respect the state-of-the-art; indeed, all cor-
rect processes stop from relaying further messages at the
round subsequent the last delivery of a process. Further-
more, these modifications make the original solutions
quiescent without assuming that processes know the size
of system.
Let us consider the network topology depicted in
Fig. 1a as an example to detail the advantages intro-
duced by the presented modifications. Let us select
node u as source process, and let us consider the
all the paths of length 2 starting from u, namely
(u, c, f ), (u, c, e), (u, b, f ), (u, b, d), (u, a, d), and (u, a, e).
Processes d, e, and f, following Modification 1,
will relay only an empty path instead of extend-
ing the paths they received, namely avoiding to gen-
erate (u, c, f , v), (u, c, e, v), (u, b, f , v), (u, b, d, v), (u, a, d, v),
and (u, a, e, v).
Processes d, e, and f, leveraging Modification 1, know
that the nodes a, b, and c have already delivered the
content associated to the paths. Applying Modifica-
tion 2, processes d, e, and f do not relay further paths
to a, b, and c, namely they do not generate paths
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(u, c, f , b), (u, c, e, a), (u, b, f , c), (u, b, d, a), (u, a, d, b), and
(u, a, e, c).
Modification 3 applies in cases a process p receives
paths in round ri but it delivers the associated content
in a round rj > ri. A neighbor q of p that has not
yet delivered the content will get the extension of paths
received by p in ri and potentially the empty path in
rj + 1. Modification 3 enables q to discard from the
analysis in delivering the associated content all paths pre-
viously received from p and to consider only the empty
pathset.
The pseudocode of our protocol is presented in Fig. 3.
For the ease of explanation and notation, we show the pro-
cedure and variables only related to the broadcast of a
single content spread by s.
Initially, every process is not aware about the nodes
in its neighborhood but it can easily retrieve them with
authenticated channels. For every not delivered con-
tent, a process stores (i) the received pathsets related
to the content (Pathsets variable), (ii) the pathsets not
yet relayed (To_Forward variable), and (iii) the labels
of neighbors that have delivered the content (Neigh_Del
variable).
Every process starts the round with the send phase,
namely selecting the messages to forward and transmit-
ting them. In particular, it extracts part or all of the
message related to a content to relay (select function),
and it forwards them to all of its neighbors that have not
yet delivered the content, thus applying Modification 3
in line 8.
Fig. 3 Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast with honest dealer protocol
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Fig. 4Multi-shortest and multi-random policies
During the receive phase, for every received message
related to a content not yet delivered, the label of the
sender is attached to the received pathset and the resulting
collection is stored in order to be considered for the deliv-
ery and to be forwarded (we assume an implicit mecha-
nism avoiding duplicate pathsets). Modification 2 enables
a process p to know that a sender q has delivered the
content (line 15). Then, Modification 3 allows p to discard
part of the pathset previously received (lines 17 − 22) and
that may arrive (line 13).
Finally, in the computation phase, all received pathsets
related to the content are analyzed. Specifically, in case a
process has received the content directly from the source
s (i.e., the sender and the source coincides, the receiver
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5 Graph topologies. n = 24, k = 4. aMultipartite wheel. b Generalized wheel. c k-pasted-tree. d k-diamond
Bonomi et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society            (2019) 25:9 Page 10 of 23
(a) (b)
Fig. 6 State of the art vs our protocol, message complexity. Random regular network, unbounded channels, f =(k−1)/2 all correct. a k = 3. b k = 5
has received the pathset {s}, line 26, Modification 1) or the
minimum vertex cut computed on pathsets is greater than
f, it delivers the content, it discards all the pathsets not
yet forwarded, and it enqueues to relay the empty pathset,
namely applying Modification 2 in lines 30 and 31.
The implementation of Modification 5 can be found in
line 12. Indeed, once that a process has delivered the con-
tent, it discards all the residual pathsets to forward (line
30). In the receive phase, all the messages related to the
content already delivered are discarded (line 12) due to
Modification 4; thus, the select function in line 6 only
extracts the empty pathset in the round subsequent the
delivery.
We prove the correctness of the proposed modifications
through the following theorems (assuming the system
model we presented and under the assumption of the
strict condition in Remark 3):
Theorem 1 Let p be a process executing either the Dolev
or the Maurer et al. algorithm to broadcast a content. If
p delivers a content received directly from the source, then
the safety property continues to be satisfied (i.e., employing
Modification 1).
Proof It follows directly from the property of the
channels (reliable and authenticated); indeed, the chan-
nels guarantee that every received message has been
previously sent by the sender that coincides with the safety
property of reliable broadcast.
Theorem 2 Let p be a process executing either the Dolev
or the Maurer et al. algorithm to broadcast a content. If p
delivered a content, then p can relay that content with an
empty path/pathset and the safety property continues to be
satisfied (i.e., employing Modification 2).
Fig. 7Multi-random policy n = 100, f =(k − 1)/2 passive Byzantines, bounded channels, message complexity and broadcast latency
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Proof The aim of the information about the nodes tra-
versed by a content is to enable a process p to decide
whether it can be safely accepted. Once it has been deliv-
ered, the information about the nodes traversed before
reaching p is not useful, because the content has been
already verified as safe by p.
Theorem 3 Let p be a process executing either the Dolev
or the Maurer et al. algorithm to broadcast a content,
and let us assume that Modification 2 is employed. Even
if p does not relay messages carrying the content to its
neighbors that already delivered it, the liveness property
continues to be satisfied (i.e., employing Modification 3).
Fig. 8Multi-shortest policy, message complexity and broadcast latency, passive Byzantines, bounded channels, n = 100, f =(k − 1)/2
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Proof Let us assume that there exists three processes
p, q, r such that only q has already delivered the con-
tent and that, among others, the following communication
channels are available: (p, q) and (q, r). From Theorem 2,
we know that process q can safely relay the content with
an empty path/pathset (i.e., employing Modification 2).
Thus, any further path/pathset containing p and q, after
the delivery of q, does not affect the results of DP and
VC verifying the content on r. It follows that any further
transmission related to the content from p to q can be
avoided after that q has delivered without compromising
liveness.
Fig. 9Multi-shortest policy, message complexity and broadcast latency, passive Byzantines, bounded channels, n = 150, f =(k − 1)/2
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Theorem 4 Let p be a process executing either the Dolev
or the Maurer et al. algorithm to broadcast a content, and
let us assume that Modification 2 is employed. If process p
receives an empty path/pathset related to a content from
a neighbor q, then p can discard from its analysis and
from relaying further path/pathset containing the label of
q and the liveness property continues to be satisfied (i.e.,
employing Modification 4).
Proof Let us assume that there exists three processes
p, q, r such that only p has already delivered a content
and that, among others, the following communication
Fig. 10Multi-shortest policy, message complexity and broadcast latency, passive Byzantines, bounded channels, n = 200, f =(k − 1)/2
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channels are available: (p, q) and (p, r). We have to prove
that process p can discard, verifying the associated con-
tent, further path/pathset containing the label of q but {q}
without affecting the liveness property. This follows from
the fact that path/pathset of unit length are included in
every solution of the VC and DP and that any path/pathset
containing more labels does not increase the value com-
puted by VC and DP. We have to prove that this reasoning
extends also for process r, so that process p can avoid
relaying further path/pathset over {q}. On process r, any
path/pathset that extends {q, p} does not increase the
value obtained by VC and DP. It follows that any other
path/pathset over {q} has not to be relayed.
Theorem 5 Let p be a process executing either Dolev or
Maurer et al. algorithm to broadcast a content, and let us
assume that Modification 2 is employed. If p has deliv-
ered and relayed the content with an empty path/pathset
to all of its neighbors, then p can stop from relaying further
related paths/pathsets and the liveness property continues
to be satisfied (i.e., employing Modification 5).
Proof It follows from the fact that any further
path/pathset related to the content received and relayed
by p does not increase the minimum cut/the maximum
disjoint paths computed on other processes with respect
the empty path/pathset relayed by p. Said differently,
all the neighbors of p receive the paths/pathset {p} and
any further path/pathset relayed by p becomes {. . . , p},
increasing neither the minimum vertex cut nor the
maximum disjoint paths.
Preventing flooding and forwarding policies
We highlighted the fact that the verification algorithm has
potentially to analyze a factorial, in the size of the network,
amount of pathsets even only considering all processes
to be correct. Nevertheless, a Byzantine process b can
potentially flood the network with spurious messages (i.e.,
m˜ := 〈s˜, ˜content, ˜pathset〉 where s˜, ˜content, and ˜pathset
can be invented by the faulty process) that are also dif-
fused by the correct ones. Considering that the amount
of messages plays a crucial impact on the employment
of the protocol we defined, a countermeasure must be
researched.
A commonway to limit the flooding capability of Byzan-
tine processes is to constraint the channel capacity of
every process, namely limiting the amount of messages
that every process is allowed to send in a time window.
Noticed that by introducing such a constraint, we are
limiting the relaying capability of every process, while the
Byzantine processes can continuously generate spurious
messages potentially preventing the liveness property to
be satisfied. It follows that a selection policy among all the
messages to relay is demanded.
Every process has to relay pathsets to all of its neighbors
that have not yet delivered the content. A pathset that may
Fig. 11 Delay forwarding policy. X-axis: network connectivity. Y-axis: broadcast latency. First row: multi-shortest bounded channel. Second row:
unbounded channel, n = 50, f = (k − 1)/2 passive Byzantine
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lead a neighbor q to the delivery of the associated content
has not contain the label of q (because it would be directly
discarded), namely a process p has to select among the
pathsets to forward the ones that do not include the label
of q. There may be many pathsets that do not include q.
Thus, we consider and evaluate two selection policies: (i)
multi-random and (ii) multi-shortest. The multi-random
is an extension of the forwarding policy proposed in [3].
The algorithms for the pathsets selection implementing
the multi-random and multi-shortest policies are pre-
sented in Fig. 4. The selection iteratively picks one pathset
and checks if it is “useful” for any neighbor (i.e., if any
neighbor to contact is not included in the pathset). This
selection continues till (i) all the neighbors to contact
receives at least one pathset where they are not included
or (ii) the bound on channel capacity has been reached.
The multi-random policy iteratively picks randomly a
possible pathset to forward, and the multi-shortest gives
priority to the shorter ones.
We compare and analyze them both in the following.
Practical reliable broadcast evaluation
We simulate the protocol and the policies we proposed in
order to evaluate their effectiveness and to compare our
protocol with the state-of-the-art solutions.
According to the system model we defined, we simulate
single broadcasts that evolves in rounds. Therefore, the
passage of time is measured in number of rounds.
We made use of the implementation provided by
Gainer-Dewar and Vera-Licona [10] for the algorithm
defined byMurakami and Uno [21] to solve the VC reduc-
tion to the hitting set problem.
We consider the following parameters in our simulation:
– n, i.e., the size of the network considered
– k, i.e., the vertex connectivity of the network
considered
– Topology, i.e., the topology of the network considered
– Channel capacity, i.e., the maximum number of
messages that a process can send in a link per round
– Kind of failure, i.e., how faulty process behave
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 12Multi-shortest policy, message complexity with either passive or non-omniscient (general) Byzantine. n = 100, f = (k − 1)/2, bounded
channels. a Random regular. bMultipartite wheel. c k-pasted-tree. d k-diamond
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– Forwarding policy, i.e., one among multi-shortest
and multi-random.
In order to carry an analysis as complete as possible, we
consider the following network topologies:
– k-regular k-connected random graph [25]
– k-pasted-tree [1];
– k-diamond [1];
– Multipartite wheel;
– Generalized wheel [26];
– Barabási-Albert graph [2].
A graph is regular if every node is connected to the same
number of neighbors, namely in a k-regular graph every
node is connected exactly to k neighbors. The k-regular
k-connected graphs have vertex connectivity equals to
k with the minimum necessary number of edges. The
k-regular k-connected random graphs are the ones uni-
formly sampled among all possible regular graphs employ-
ing the sampling methodology defined in [25].
The k-pasted-trees and k-diamond graphs are Logarith-
mic Harary Graph [14], namely topologies designed to be
robust to failures and suited for distributed systems where
the information spreading occurs by message flooding.
Indeed, they are k-connected graphs with a logarithmic
diameter and with minimal edges guaranteeing the node
connectivity (i.e., the removal of an edge decreases vertex
connectivity of the network). For specific values of net-
work size n and vertex connectivity k, they are k-regular.
A graphical example of k-pasted-trees and k-diamond is
respectively presented in Fig. 5c, d.
We refer with multipartite wheel to a regular graph
composed by the concatenation of disjoint groups of
k/2 nodes such that every node in a group is con-
nected to exactly all the k/2 nodes in other 2 groups
and no node inside a group is connected with others
of the same group. A graphical example is provided
in Fig. 5a.
Notice that k-regular k-connected graphs can be con-
structed in several ways; indeed, we are considering four
different constructions that are either always regular or
regular for specific settings. The sequel demonstrates that
the specific construction impacts protocol performance.
We considered also the Barabási-Albert graphs that
model complex and social networks with scale-free power
law degree distribution. The aim is to evaluate our
protocol also on topologies not designed for distributed
systems.
Fig. 13Multi-shortest policy, omniscient Byzantine faults. n = 100, f = (k − 1)/2, bounded channels
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Finally, we consider the generalized wheel, i.e., the
topology generated by the disjoint union between a cycle
and a k − 2 clique. An example can be found in Fig. 5b. It
has been considered as a worst case scenario.
We carry our simulations either considering the maxi-
mum number of tolerable faulty processes, thus for every
k-connected network, we assume f = (k − 1)/2 failures
(Remark 3), or testing all possible values for f between 0
and (k − 1)/2. In any case, processes deliver a content
only when the related pathsets have a minimum vertex cut
greater than (k − 1)/2.
We consider two configurations for the channel
capacity: bounded and unbounded. The former constrains
processes to send a limited number of messages per link
in every round, and the latter imposes no restriction. For
the bounded case, we assume a bound for the channel
capacity equal to f + 1 messages.
Simulating byzantine behaviors
We move from the scenario where all processes are cor-
rect to the case where the f Byzantine processes act
as crash failures (thus not relaying any message, we
refer to them as passive Byzantines), till the case they
spread spurious messages (we refer to them as active
Byzantines). Specifically to this last scenario, we have to
notice that spurious contents (i.e., contents generated by
Byzantine processes bi = s sent inside a message with
source s) are never accepted by correct processes (if the
BRB enabling condition in Remark 2 is met) and their
spreading and verification are disjoint with respect to
the content broadcast by the source (because they are
related to a different s - content). For this reason, we
impose to Byzantine processes to spread only spurious
pathsets in our simulations (thus relaying the content
broadcast by the source). The purpose is to flood the
correct processes with spurious pathsets trying to not
facilitate the achievement of the delivery condition. In
detail, the Byzantine processes diffuse pathsets contain-
ing the label of one correct neighbor of the receiver in
the first round, and pathsets containing one of the cor-
rect neighbor of the receiver with a random label in the
subsequent rounds. Every Byzantine process sends f + 1
messages (the maximum amount allowed by the channel
capacity) containing different pathsets on every of its link
per round.
Additionally, we consider two kinds of active Byzan-
tine processes: omniscient and general. Omniscient active
faulty processes know the content that the source is
Fig. 14Multi-shortest policy, omniscient active Byzantine faults. n = 150, f =(k − 1)/2, bounded channels
Bonomi et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society            (2019) 25:9 Page 18 of 23
going to spread before receiving it through a message;
thus, they start flooding correct processes with spouri-
ous pathsets from the beginning of broadcast. General
active faulty processes, instead, spreads spurious pathsets
in the round subsequent the first reception of a message
containing the content, namely as soon as they get knowl-
edge about the content through the network. Notice that
there are other strategies that Byzantine processes may
adopt generating spourious pathsets, especially if such
Byzantines are omniscient about the state of all other
processes. The Byzantine strategy that we adopted has
been choosen to allow faulty processes to generate path-
sets that may be selected by the correct process due to
their length.
In every simulation, the source and the Byzantine pro-
cesses are randomly placed.
For all the results, we are going to show we directly
plot all the measures we got as points (except for Figs. 6,
15, and 16 where the mean of the measures is depicted)
in order to show their distributions, and we accordingly
increase the size of the points with higher density.
Comparison with the state-of-the-art
We start comparing the message complexity of the state-
of-the-art solutions with our protocol. We consider k-
regular k-connected random graphs, we assume the vertex
connectivity k equal to 3 and 5, we simulateD-BRB,MTD-
BRB, and BFT-MTB considering unbounded channels and
all correct processes, and we vary the size of the network
from n = 6 to n = 20.
We previously remarked about the lack in the state-
of-the-art protocols of a halting condition; indeed, they
generate all source-to-other paths/pathsets in every exe-
cution. It can be noticed in Fig. 6 that the modifications
we defined have a remarkable impact on themessage com-
plexity even in a small and all-correct scenario. It can also
be noticed the advantage gained by choosing pathsets over
paths, as expected.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 15Multi-shortest policy, varying the number of faults, message complexity, passive Byzantines. n = 100. a Random regular. bMultipartite
wheel. c k-pasted-tree. d k-diamond
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Multi-random vs multi-shortest
We proposed as a countermeasure against the capability
of Byzantine processes to flood the network a constraint
on the channel capacity, namely limiting the amount of
messages that a process can send over a link per round,
and we set this bound equal to f + 1. Then, we pro-
posed two forwarding policies to select which pathsets
relay in the actual round. Assuming bounded channels,
we compare the presented policies, multi-random and
multi-shortest, considering networks of size n = 100,
topologies random regular, multipartite wheel, k-diamond
and k-pasted-tree, and passive Byzantine failures. The
results are presented in Figs. 7 and 8 (notice that scale of
the graphics in Fig. 7 are logarithmic). Starting with the
multi-random policy, it can be seen in Fig. 7 that while
for some graphs the multi-random policy acts smoothly
the random regular (confirming the results achieved in
our preliminary work [3]), the multipartite wheel graphs
,and the k-diamond, there exist topologies where the
broadcast latency and message complexity may conspic-
uously increase (k-pasted-tree). It follows that on some
kind of graphs, the selections of paths that the multi-
random policy may take are not equivalent with respect
to the protocol progression and that additional crite-
rion has to be considered in the selection. This lead us
to discard such a policy to be one generally employ-
able. Contrarily, the performance achieved employing the
multi-shortest policy appears not affected by this mis-
behavior (Fig. 8). Therefore, we further investigate the
multi-shortest policy while increasing the size of the
network.
Multi-shortest policy detailed evaluation
We assume bounded channels and the multi-shortest pol-
icy, considering networks of size n = 150 and n = 200,
topologies random regular, multipartite wheel, k-diamond
and k-pasted-tree, and passive and active Byzantine fail-
ures. First results are presented in Figs. 9 and 10. It is
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Fig. 16Multi-shortest policy, varying the number of faults, message complexity, active omniscient Byzantines. n = 100. a Random regular.
bMultipartite wheel. c k-pasted-tree. d k-diamond
Bonomi et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society            (2019) 25:9 Page 20 of 23
(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Fig. 17Multi-Shortest policy, Barababasi-Albert Network, bounded channels, f =(k − 1)/2. Message complexity, n = 100, 150, 200 (a) passive
Byzantines, (b) active omniscient Byzantines. Broadcast latency, passive Byzantines (c) n = 100, (d) n = 150, (e) n = 200
possible to see that the trends of the message complexity
and broadcast latency keep defined employing our proto-
col joined with the multi-shortest policy while increasing
the size of the network and considering passive Byzantine
failures. Specifically, the message complexity keeps always
close or below the n2 boundary. It can also be deduced
that a regular network not necessarily results in optimal
performances employing our protocol; indeed, there are
notable differences in the results obtained considering
different topologies.
It can also be noticed from the distribution of the
measures that there are several topologies (k-pasted-tree,
k-diamond, and especially multipartite wheel) where the
placement of the source and the Byzantine failures plays a
remarkable impact on the message complexity. Additional
details will be later provided.
To evaluate the effects of the multi-shortest policy on
the broadcast latency, we simulate the BFT-BRB protocol
employing either the multi-shortest policy or unbounded
channels, considering passive Byzantine processes and
networks of size n = 100. It can be deduced (Fig. 11) that
the policy we defined introduces negligible delays.
We move to consider the case of active Byzatine
processes, specifically in Fig. 12, general active (non-
omniscient) Byzantine faults are assumed. It can be
Fig. 18 The Barababasi-Albert network, relation between the
attachment parameterm and the network connectivity
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noticed that spreading spourious pathsets (using the strat-
egy we defined) once they get knowledge about a con-
tent, the Byzantine processes have no negative impact on
the message complexity. As a matter of fact, they may
even help correct processes achieving reliable broadcast
(because they relay the content even if they try not to
increase the VC on the receiving processes).
We consider the case of omniscient Byzantine faulty
processes, which start spreading spurious pathset about
the content from the beginning of broadcast. The results
we obtained are presented in Figs. 13 and 14. It is possi-
ble to see that such stronger Byzantine faults are able to
remarkably increase the message complexity; nonetheless,
it keeps close to the n2 threshold.
Varying the number of failures
We evaluate how the message complexity evolves when
the number of faulty processes is not maximized.We plot-
ted the results we obtained in Figs. 15 and 16. Whatever is
the amount of failures, processes deliver a content only if
the associated minimum cut is greater than (k − 1)/2.
It is possible to deduce that the resulting message com-
plexity depends on the specific topology considered and
on the degree of connectivity. Specifically, both in case of
passive and omniscient active Byzantine faults, there are
settings where the message complexity remains constant
independently from the number of effective failures and
others where the message complexity increases exponen-
tially with the number of failures.
Barabási-Albert graph
We separately evaluated in Fig. 17 our algorithm in
a Barabási-Albert graph while varying the attachment
parameter m, in order to analyze our protocol on a
topology with different degree distribution with respect
to the previous analyzed. The BFT-BRB protocol and
the multi-shortest forwarding policy have shown to keep
performing in the same manner. To allow the reader to
make a comparison with the other topologies, we plot in
Fig. 18 the relation between the attachment parameter m
and the network connectivity.
These simulations allow us to conclude that a Byzantine
tolerable reliable broadcast protocol practically employ-
able in synchronous systems without considering further
assumptions with respect the state of the art is achievable.
Worst case scenarios
For the ease of completeness, we briefly survey two worst
case scenarios: the multipartite wheel and the generalized
wheel. Fig. 19a summarized one of the executions we are
going to present. Let us consider the multipartite wheel
of size n = 21 and k = 6, choose a node as source (in
Fig. 19a depicted in orange), and place two faulty pro-
cesses (in red) in its neighborhood in distinct groups (i.e.,
those neighbor will have different neighbors). It results
that only two correct processes per group deliver the con-
tent during the first round. Subsequently, they relay the
message to all the nodes in the consecutive group. But,
none of this node is able to deliver the message: the mini-
mum cut of the generated paths is 2 and processes demand
paths with minimum cut at least 3. The nodes succeed in
delivering the message only when “the propagation on the
two sides met,” achieving a minimum cut of 4. It can be
noticed that a considerable amount of paths may be gener-
ated in this specific worst case scenario while the values of
n and k increases. Nonetheless, the BFT-BRB protocol and
the multi-shortest policy reduced such a message com-
plexity case as shown in Figs. 8, 9, and 10. We additionally
simulate in Fig. 20a our protocol with the multi-dhortest
policy on a multipartite wheel of size n = 100 with passive
Byzantine in the worst placement.
Another worst case scenario is depicted in Fig. 19b.
Let us assume a generalized wheel, pick a source on the
cycle, and the Byzantine processes are always located on
Fig. 19Worst case scenarios. Multipartite wheel (a) and generalized wheel (b)
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(a) (b)
Fig. 20Multi-shortest policy, generalized wheel, worst Byzantine placementm passive Byzantine. aMultipartite wheel. b Generalized wheel
the clique. Fig. 20b show that in this specific case, our
algorithm and the multi-shortest policy are less effec-
tive in reducing the message complexity while Byzantine
processes are located in the clique.
Conclusion
We revisited available solutions for the reliable broadcast
in general network hit by up to f arbitrarily distributed
Byzantine failures, and proposed modifications following
performance-related observations. Although the deliv-
ery complexity of our protocol remains unchanged with
respect to the state-of-the-art solutions, our experiments
show that it is possible to drastically reduce the message
complexity (from factorial to polynomial in the size of the
network), practically enabling reliable broadcast in larger
systems and networks with authenticated channels. There
are several open problems that may follow: Is it possible to
define a solution to the hitting set problem suited for the
specific input generated by our protocol? Is it possible to
remove from the system the contents generated by Byzan-
tine processes? And under which assumption? Which are
the graph parameters that govern the message complex-
ity of our protocol? Our results open to the possibility
of identifying a polynomial theoretical bound on message
complexity solving the reliable broadcast problem with
honest dealer. Finally, the Bizantine reliable broadcast
problem should be analyzed also on dynamic networks.
Even if the protocol we proposed can directly be employed
on asynchronous and/or dynamic systems, the achieved
gain in message complexity is not guaranteed due to the
weaker synchrony assumptions, and probably, specific
assumption on the evolution of the system must be guar-
anteed in searching a practical employable solution.
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